The Taiwan question is entering a "critical decade": Prof. Wang Yingjin

The timing for resolving the Taiwan issue is "almost ripe, but not quite."

Professor 王英津 Wang Yingjin, Director of the Research Center for Cross-Strait Relations and Research Fellow at the National School of Development at Renmin University of China, delivered a speech on the Taiwan question at the 10th Cross-Strait Think Tank Academic Forum in November, held in Zhongshan City, south China's Guangdong Province.

According to Xinhua News Agency, the forum was jointly organized by the Institute of Taiwan Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the National Society of Taiwan Studies, the Graduate Institute for Taiwan Studies of Xiamen University, the Taiwan 21st Century Foundation, the Graduate Institute of National Department and mainland China Studies of the Chinese Culture University in Taiwan. More than 60 experts and scholars from both sides of the Taiwan Strait attended the event.

Some of you might be wondering why I’m bringing up a speech which was delivered three months ago. Actually, based on my research, most of the content from Professor Wang’s speech has only recently been made public. It’s not necessarily intentional to release it at this moment, as publishing academic or theoretical content weeks or months after an event is not uncommon in China.

Professor Wang’s speech covered a wide range of topics on Taiwan, including his analysis of the possibility of non-peaceful unification by the Chinese mainland and the impact of China-U.S. relations on the Taiwan question. I believe people who are interested in reading today's piece about Wang's speech should focus more on the content itself rather than the timing of its release.

The article about Professor Wang’s speech was published by China Review News Agency on Feb. 10 via its WeChat blog. I have translated it into English for you. The bolded markings in this article were also labeled by me.

Additionally, I’d like to highlight that, based on my personal observation, discussions on the Taiwan question within China’s academic circles are rich and diverse. Such a variety of perspectives is beneficial in allowing China to ultimately approach the Taiwan question from the standpoint that best serves its national interests. Therefore, I believe it’s important for readers not to interpret an individual expert’s viewpoint as representing the official stance of the Chinese government. However, I believe that policymakers, after considering a range of expert opinions, will draw their conclusions. As such, understanding these expert perspectives is meaningful.

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Wang Yingjin

Wang explained that, in the context of growing strategic competition between China and the United States, the Taiwan question has become more complex. Legally, the Taiwan question is entirely an internal affair for China, and this fundamental reality won’t change despite external interference. However, in practical terms, international factors—especially the unprecedented involvement of the U.S. and Western powers—have made resolving the issue much more difficult and costly. For years, these external forces have used Taiwan to undermine China’s development. If this continues, it will only increase the costs of resolving the issue and slow down the progress of China’s rejuvenation. Given this, Wang argued, China must carefully assess the current situation, understand its strengths, and seize the right moment to resolve the Taiwan issue.

First, China has the strength and capability to resolve the Taiwan issue. Wang pointed out that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, and today, 183 sovereign nations in the world recognize the one-China principle. With China’s growing military power, the country is fully capable of addressing the Taiwan issue. Faced with the large disparity in military strength across the Taiwan Strait, pro-independence forces in Taiwan know they can’t resist the mainland militarily, so they rely on hopes that the U.S. and its Western allies will intervene. However, the question remains: if China decides to use non-peaceful measures to resolve the issue under the Anti-Secession Law, will the U.S. and its allies actually intervene? It’s well-known that the U.S. and China have different interests and bottom lines when it comes to Taiwan. For China, the Taiwan issue is a core national interest, and if a war were to break out in the Taiwan Strait, China would spare no effort to win. Even if the situation becomes difficult at first, China will not back down, but will continue to invest whatever is needed to secure victory.

On the other hand, for the U.S., Taiwan is just a strategic foothold in its broader Asia-Pacific (or Indo-Pacific) strategy—not a core interest. Wang pointed out that the differing importance of Taiwan for both countries means the U.S. would not be willing to invest the same resources into a war as China would. Moreover, Taiwan is so close to the mainland and within range of China’s rocket artillery, and the balance of power between the U.S. and China is not as stark as some might think. Unless the U.S. were to invest all its resources, it simply cannot win against China and achieve its goal of "protecting Taiwan."

On the other hand, investing too much would make the costs far exceed any potential benefits. This contradiction is what makes the United States' potential involvement in a Taiwan Strait conflict both unpredictable and limited. As a result, prominent Taiwanese strategist Su Qi has predicted that, should a conflict break out, the U.S. is unlikely to send troops directly to defend Taiwan. And as long as the U.S. doesn’t intervene, allies like Japan and Australia will be even less likely to engage, as they have far less at stake in the Taiwan issue than the U.S. Given China’s rise as an economic, technological, and military power, it’s clear that the U.S. and its allies would carefully weigh the costs and risks of engaging in direct military conflict with China.

Wang Yingjin stated that once the war begins, no matter the obstacles, victory will ultimately belong to the Chinese mainland. The struggle between intervention and counter-intervention, pro-independence and anti-independence forces, and the rejection versus promotion of reunification, will determine that the Chinese mainland is on the side of justice and righteousness, while the U.S. and Taiwan are in the wrong. The nature of the conflict, along with the justice, legitimacy, and legality of China’s decision to use non-peaceful means to combat "Taiwan independence," will fundamentally shape the war’s course and final outcome.

Second, the timing for resolving the Taiwan issue is "almost ripe, but not quite." Wang pointed out that while China has the strength and capability to resolve the Taiwan issue, it doesn’t mean the time is fully right yet. Given the enormous costs involved in taking non-peaceful measures, including the risks of delaying or even derailing China’s national rejuvenation, and the increased difficulty of governing Taiwan post-conflict, The Chinese mainland will avoid using force unless absolutely necessary. Instead, China will continue to pursue peaceful reunification. Moreover, the urgency of the Taiwan issue hasn’t yet reached a point where it must be resolved immediately, which is why the Chinese mainland has held off from using non-peaceful measures despite repeated provocations from pro-independence forces in Taiwan.

Furthermore, if the Chinese mainland were to resort to non-peaceful means, even if it won the war, it would likely face sweeping sanctions from the U.S. and its allies in areas like the economy, energy, food, trade, finance, and technology. Wang believes that, despite China’s growing strength, handling the economic and political pressure from the U.S. and the West would still be challenging. If this scenario unfolds, it could significantly disrupt China’s progress toward national rejuvenation, or even slow it down. This is a cost that China must carefully weigh, especially as it nears its goal of national revival. The U.S., Western powers, and pro-independence forces understand this concern, which is why they continue to provoke China with impunity. What they fail to realize is that their constant pressure could "backfire," pushing the Chinese mainland into a position where it feels compelled to decisively resolve the Taiwan issue and shift the current dynamics.

Third, the Taiwan issue is entering a "critical decade." Wang explained that, from an external perspective, U.S. figures like former President Biden, former Secretary of State Blinken, and various strategic experts have all noted that the next ten years will likely be the most intense period of competition between China and the U.S. This means that the next decade will be crucial not just for the strategic standoff over Taiwan but also for the future of cross-Strait relations. The decisions made during this time will deeply influence, if not determine, the future direction of the Taiwan issue. It’s clear that, during this "critical decade," the U.S. and other external powers will continue to intervene in Taiwan’s affairs and block China’s efforts to reunify. In this context, no matter how much goodwill China shows, it won’t change the United States’ strategy of containing China. So, how should China respond? Should it be passive, or take proactive action? Historically, "extreme situations often lead to reversal," and sometimes, being "forced into a corner" can trigger an instinctive counterattack, allowing China to break through and change the situation in its favor.

Looking at the situation from the island’s perspective, pro-independence activities in Taiwan are becoming more brazen, and the public’s sense of identification with the one-China principle is steadily weakening. Support for reunification is also dwindling. If Taiwan’s issue continues to be left unresolved indefinitely, the chances for peaceful reunification across the Strait will only grow slimmer. Since 2016, the situation across the Taiwan Strait has worsened, leading to the tense standoff we see today. What’s even more worrying is that the situation is still deteriorating, with no signs of improvement in the near future. This only adds to the uncertainty about how things will unfold in the coming years.

From the Chinese mainland’s perspective, achieving national reunification has been a steadfast mission for the Communist Party of China and the government since 1949. In the 1980s, the Party and the government set three major historical goals, one of which was the "great cause of national reunification." As the new century began, reunification was once again placed at the forefront of China’s historical agenda. To date, the other two goals have largely been achieved—though not yet fully completed, progress continues along the current strategic path, and their eventual realization seems inevitable. However, the reunification cause has faced significant setbacks, and the resistance encountered has only intensified over time.

[Beijing Scroll’s note: It is worth noting that the other two tasks include advancing modernization and maintaining world peace while promoting common development. When you consider these three tasks together, you can see not only the mainland's determination to achieve reunification but also its sincere intention to do so through peaceful means.]

Wang believes that, in the face of these obstacles, the Chinese mainland urgently needs to break the deadlock and push the reunification process into a new stage. However, since the conditions and timing aren’t fully mature yet, the Chinese mainland won’t rush into invoking the Anti-Secession Law and taking non-peaceful measures. Instead, it will delay the reunification timeline slightly, making the necessary preparations to lay a more solid foundation and create more favorable conditions for a future resolution of the Taiwan issue. But this approach hinges on one key factor: external interference and pro-independence forces in Taiwan must not cross the Chinese mainland’s "red line." If they do, China will take whatever steps are necessary to eliminate "Taiwan independence" and complete the reunification of the nation.

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